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Beyts v Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd: Caught Short on Data Protection and Privacy
Small claims 1 in the sheriff court do not often fire the imagination of the national press, and Ms
Beyts herself seems previously to have figured in the local newspapers only to the extent of small print on charity swims 2 and an award-winning photograph of nacreous clouds over rural Aberdeenshire. 3 In April this year the defenders' presidential associations in Beyts v Trump
International Golf Club Scotland Ltd 4 bucked this trend, sending Ms Beyts' name down the newswires from Catterline to Yekaterinburg. A regrettable omission from that press extravaganza, however, was proper discussion of the intriguing legal issues which this case raised.
A. THE FACTS
Whether or not Ms Beyts would subscribe to the accolade of "environment activist" awarded to her by The Guardian, 5 she was one of the group of individuals in the local community who had opposed the defenders' golf resort development on the Aberdeenshire coast at Menie. On the day in question she and a friend had used a public right of access across the golf course on their way to the beach, pausing, however, to take a photograph of a flagpole that was the subject of a disputed planning application. In doing so they were noticed by a Trump employee, who, along with two colleagues (all men), drove on to the course to observe the pursuer and her friend.
Meanwhile the pursuer, who was affected by a medical condition, felt an urgent need to answer a call of nature and she found for this purpose a spot in the sand dunes which she believed was secluded. She was unaware that 230 metres away she was being watched by the three Trump employees, one of whom used his mobile phone to take a picture of her urinating, and thereafter reported the incident to the police. The first intimation that the pursuer received of this 6 was at 10 pm that evening when two police officers arrived at her home and charged her with a contravention of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, section 47, which provides that "any person who urinates…in such circumstances as to cause, or to be likely to cause, annoyance 
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to any other person shall be guilty of an offence". Criminal proceedings were never brought, and instead the pursuer raised an action against the defenders based upon the defenders' breach of the Data Protection Act 1998. As narrated by Sheriff Donald Corke, the injury that she had suffered was constituted by distress about: (i) the circumstances of being charged with a criminal offence (ii) the fact that men had watched her urinating; and (iii) the fact of being photographed in this act.
B. APPLICATION OF THE DATA PROTECTION ACT 1998
It was uncontroversial that the digital photograph taken by the Trump employee was personal data and that the defenders were the data controller in terms of the Data Protection Act 1998, section clarified that compensation could be awarded in terms of section 13 where the individual had suffered distress only, even if there was no other type of loss. However, the pursuer did not look beyond this to cite a breach of any of the eight data protection principles to which data controllers are bound to adhere as stated in section 4 and listed in Part I of Schedule 1 of the Act. The sheriff noted: "Her solicitor advocate was specific in stating that were it not for the failure to register, we would not have been here considering the case." 8 Thus the fatal gap in the pursuer's argument as pled was the absence of a causal connection between the failure to register and the undoubtedly real distress which she experienced during this episode. The sheriff therefore had no option but to dismiss the claim.
This conclusion meant that there was no need to consider the defence that the defenders would have put forward under section 29 of the 1998 Act, to the effect that the offending data was being processed for "the prevention or detection of crime" of "the apprehension or prosecution of offenders". This defence would in any event have been "unattractive" 9 given that in crossing the golf course the pursuer had been exercising an access right permissible in terms of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, and in finding a discreet place to urinate she had acted can be said for sure is that: "it does not follow that, because a specific right to privacy has not so far been recognised, such a right does not fall within existing principles of the law." There have, however, been one or two cases in which "intrusion" upon the privacy of the person has been acknowledged as actionable, although the basis for delictual liability was not clearly articulated. And on a wider view, the Scots framework is not limited to the extent that the pigeonhole system of discrete nominate torts constrains the development of English law. The law of delict has a more flexible structure, in which specific categories of delictual liability are underpinned by general principle. As Lord Hope characterised cross-border difference:
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With us, of course, delict is a part of the law of obligations. It is a broad concept, embracing all civil claims for reparation which lie outside the area of contract. In England the law of torts has grown up by the use of precedent. Lawyers accustomed to relying upon precedent are troubled when they come across something new. The creation of a new tort is a bold, some would say an irresponsible, exercise -not to be undertaken lightly. To embrace something new within the concept of delict is so much easier.
As noted above there is persuasive authority for acknowledging privacy of the person as deserving of protection. It seems that in England the future availability of a remedy for intrusions of the type experienced by Ms Beyts will depend upon finding an appropriate "peg" on which to hang it. For the Scots, on the other hand, the primary concern is not the remedy but the right. As Lord Dunedin succinctly reflected: "You may not get what you want, but that will be because you failed to show that you had the right to get it". 39 Did the pursuer suffer relevant harm as a consequence of the defender infringing a protected interest? In circumstances where the defender has flouted the pursuer's "reasonable expectation of privacy", 40 as alleged to have occurred here, that question deserves to be asked. 40 Acknowledged by the sheriff at para 13.
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